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Date: Thu, 24 Apr 2003 19:58:25 -0700
Subject: Re: (urth) Generic Considerations
From: Jason Ingram
I don't recognize many of my opinions in the arguments against which
Blattid responds. Perhaps that's because I was unclear and hasty in my
earlier posts. Rather than exacerbating the risk of seriously
misunderstanding each other's positions, I'll try to present a general
response.
We're using ambiguous terms (reality, truth, fact) to distinguish other
ambiguous terms (fiction, ?,?). I like ambiguity, and don't
particularly want to draw clear delineations between fact and reality.
Blattid's distinctions make sense--but there's also some slippage.
Delirium, for instance, is a fact that expresses truths but is also a
fiction that expresses falsehoods: delirious visions are subjectively
real, and are factual occurrences, but their contents are fictitious
and non-factual.
Empirical verifiability is nice, and can challenge common sense (e.g.
dropping an apple and a ball of iron to see which falls faster).
Fetishizing empirical verifiability is, to be simplistic, bad. So far
I don't think Blattid would disagree. Fact, truth, reality . . . ok;
whichever is fine with me.
I'm comfortable remaining silent about that which we cannot speak.
To extend the Wittgensteinian trope, Wolfe's characters present a
variety of language-games that challenge defenders of a continuum of
objectivity. That is, the indeterminacy of the gaps in Latro's
narratives aspire to different ideal of objectivity (this terminology
is an arbitrary imposition) than the objectivity at issue with Horn or
the text of 5HC. Objectivity could mean, to use what I interpret to be
Blattid's terminology, "truthfulness" for some, "factualness" for
others, and "realness" for a third group. Each should aspire to attain
their ideals of objectivity, but each will be playing a different
language-game with different standards.
Three specific replies:
[Blattid]:
> Since all reporters are, willy-nilly, biassed, I prefer a reporter
> who is open about her bias.
yes, I agree, and I think this is perfectly consistent with my earlier
viewpoint. Apologies if I was misleading in my exposition.
[Blattid]:
> Unless one were to create a language with an infinite vocabulary,
> it's not merely a straw-dog but a chimera. I have little truck with
> positivism, but that doesn't mean we need to throw objectivity out
> the window.
The problems with positivism are even more serious than that; see the
above on objectivity.
[Blattid]:
> I guess the question I want to ask of this view is, what was there
> before language existed to construct "reality" from?
Flippant answer: Severian
Serious answer: Silence
Academic answer: It's hard to talk about the non-discursive. I think
there are problems with Kantian approaches to reality (there is a
really real real out there, but we can't know anything for certain
about it; we can only know about the conditions of possibility of
knowledge and sense-perception), but don't want to get into that
discussion. It's not so much *language* as *subjects* that construct
realities. This doesn't mean that anything and everything is up for
grabs; there are always constraints. However, absent foundationalist
arguments, it's hard to specify what those constraints are. Solution:
Experimentation to test limits?
Cordially,
Sepia
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